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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This brief discusses the history of the criminalization of homelessness. Specifically, this 
brief explores historical criminalization laws and the framework created for modern anti-
homeless ordinances. This brief’s section on historical criminalization laws will explore the 
impetus for their creation, their effects, and ultimately the reasons for their repeal. Next, modern 
anti-homeless ordinances are analyzed through three modern case studies. Finally, historical 
criminalization laws and modern anti-homeless ordinances are compared, revealing their 
similarities in form, function, and phrasing. These similarities should lead to the repeal of 
modern anti-homeless ordinances: a similar fate of historical criminalization laws.  
Historical exclusion laws targeted groups to exclude them from public space. The following are 
examples of exclusion laws and their purposes: 
 Laws were created in England and early colonial America to protect “public space” from 
disreputable individuals.
1
 
 Warning-out was a process by which colonial towns could exclude people from 
communities by preventing them (if they thought they were going to be a welfare burden) 
from obtaining residence if they could not prove either financial self-sufficiency and/or 
familial heritage to the community.
2
 
 The English government adopted increasingly punitive vagrancy laws directed against 
wandering, unemployed indigents.
3
 
 Elizabethan poor laws gave power to cities over the daily lives of the poor.  
 The great migration to the West, during the Dust Bowl, gave rise to the term “Okie” and 
created a negative connotation as Western states felt the burden of an excess population.
4
 
 In the case of sundown towns, these laws were meant to keep minorities—often times 
African American, Chinese American, or Hispanics—from residing in the town.5 
 The United States Supreme Court struck down vagrancy and loitering laws as 
impermissibly vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 Although many states were encouraged to overturn, repeal, or discontinue enforcement of 
these laws without intervention from the Supreme Court or Congress, the process was 
slow to conclude.
6
 
Modern anti-homeless ordinances seem to be a response to the repeal of historical exclusion 
laws, but still function in the same manner: 
                                                 
1
 Sandra Wachholz, Hate Crimes Against the Homeless: Warning-Out New England Style, JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE, VOL. XXXII, NUM. 4, 141 (Dec. 2005). 
2
 Id.  
3
 Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless 
Persons From American Cities, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 631 (1992). 
4
 DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL—THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S, 50 (25th Anniversary ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2004) (other terms for Okies including “Arkies” or “Texies”). 
5
 Tom I. Romero, II, No Brown Towns: Anti-Immigrant Ordinances and Equality of Educational Opportunity for 
Latina/os, 12 J. Gender Race & Just. 13, 30-32 (2008). 
6
 Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of 
Handicapped Persons as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975) 
(stating that many ugly laws were not repealed until the 1970s and the latest were still in effect until 1974). 
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 The repeal of historical vagrancy and group-specific exclusion laws led to the creation of 
more detailed modern conduct-specific ordinances. 
 The removal of homeless individuals from a city’s public spaces as a policy goal was 
largely influenced by the Broken Windows theory. 
 Modern criminalization ordinances afford law enforcement similar discretion as was 
afforded under the historical vagrancy/group-specific exclusion laws. 
 In form and function, modern criminalization ordinances are similar to historical 
exclusion laws that society has already rejected on legal and policy grounds.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
7
  
 
The criminalization of homelessness is an issue that affects cities and counties across the 
United States. The past decade has seen a drastic increase in the number of homeless people in 
cities across the country.
8
 Due to the increase of homeless people, many cities are finding it 
difficult to assist them.
9
 The visibility of homelessness in cities has led to attempts to decrease 
the visible presence of homeless people
10
 by criminalizing the conduct of “life-sustaining 
activities” in public.11 These criminalization laws impact the living conditions of America’s 
homeless population, many of whom are “socially isolated[] and are part of no community.”12  
 
 The targeted exclusion of specific marginalized groups in general is much older than 
modern efforts. Modern criminalization laws find their roots in English and colonial vagrancy 
laws.
13
 Vagrancy laws punished vagrants—people who travelled from city-to-city without 
money or a job—for fear they would burden the state by requiring extreme welfare and inviting 
lawlessness to enter the town.
14
 These laws worked to give local authorities the right to banish 
people from sharing space. 
 
 Beyond colonial vagrancy laws, current anti-homeless ordinances share similarities with 
other historical exclusion laws. Some historical exclusion laws subjugated African-Americans 
and controlled where they could sit, stand, or visit.
15
 During the Dust Bowl era of the early-
twentieth century, migrant farmers from the plains states were prohibited from entering states 
like California and Washington.
16
 Finally, people with physical disabilities were punished for 
appearing in public spaces in the twentieth century.
17
 These examples reveal the history of 
exclusion in the United States. 
 
 The fight to control public space drives the creation of many of the modern 
criminalization laws against the homeless. This brief defines public space as “all areas that are 
open and accessible to all members of the public in a society, in principle though not necessarily 
in practice.”18 The struggle to control public spaces is seen in the implementation of historical 
                                                 
7
 ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE [THE RED LILY] (Nabu Press 2010). 
8
 NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN 
U.S. CITIES (2014) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR.], available at http://nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place.   
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (the court defining life-sustaining activities 
as including eating, sleeping, and sitting). 
12
 Id. at 1553. 
13
 Simon, supra note 3, at 635. 
14
 Wachholz, supra note 1, at 141.  
15
 See C. VANN WOODARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Oxford Univ. Press 1974). 
16
 WORSTER, supra note 4. 
17
 Susan Schweik, Kicked to the Curb: Ugly Law Then and Now, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2012). 
18
 ANTHONY M. ORUM & ZACHARY P. NEAL, COMMON GROUND? READINGS AND REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC SPACE 
(THE METROPOLIS AND MODERN LIFE) (Routledge 2009).  
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exclusion laws. Each of these laws worked to exclude many groups of individuals that were 
deemed undesirable by people in control. Some of these laws specifically stated that certain 
people had to leave towns and cities. Many local authorities hid behind ancient duties that they 
believed they owed to residents to control space and its accessibility. 
 
Current anti-homeless ordinances seek to criminalize the basic human life-sustaining 
conduct of homeless people and in turn, limit their accessibility to public spaces.
19
 This conduct, 
however, is not in and of itself criminal. The attribution of the conduct to homeless people, 
however, has made the acts—sitting, eating, or sleeping in public spaces—punishable.20 By 
punishing these acts, local authorities are controlling public spaces much like the local 
authorities that enforced historical exclusion laws did.  
 
This brief illustrates and analyzes select historical exclusion laws like the ones stated 
above to show why today’s criminalization of homelessness is not new, and also seeks to 
understand why states like Washington and cities like Seattle criminalize homelessness. The 
brief opens with a survey of historical criminalization laws and discusses how the underlying 
rationale for these historical laws was control over public space. Next, this brief examines the 
shift from historical criminalization laws to modern anti-homeless ordinances by highlighting 
case studies of homeless criminalization practices from around the country, illuminating 
examples of criminalization ordinances and how they target homeless people. Finally, this brief 
ends by exploring the similarities between historical criminalization laws and modern anti-
homeless ordinances, showing how the similarities in form, function, and phrasing of these two 
types of laws should compel society to reject anti-homeless ordinances just like historical 
exclusion laws. 
 
I. HISTORICAL EXCLUSION LAWS  
 
The trend to punish homeless people’s “life-sustaining activities” has received a recent 
push by many cities; laws of this nature are not new. Laws punishing conduct existed in the 
United States as far back as the original colonies.
21
 These conduct-punishing laws, however, 
historically focused on specific groups in the United States. These laws, when compared to 
modern anti-homeless ordinances, show a repeated effort to exclude groups from participating in 
public space. This section looks at historical criminalization laws in the United States and 
analyzes how these laws came to be, their effects, and ultimately, how they were overturned.  
 
A. Vagrancy Laws 
 
 Many of today’s laws criminalizing homelessness stem from colonial vagrancy laws that 
were adopted from England.
22
 In the fourteenth century, England’s population suffered massive 
                                                 
19
 NAT’L LAW CTR, supra note 8. 
20
 Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space Law: The Roots and Implications of Homeless Laws in the United States, 
29 ANTIPODE 305 (1997). 
21
 Simon, supra note 3, at 635. 
22
 Id. 
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deaths and economic struggles after the Black Death.
23
 In response, the English government 
enacted statutes to help the economy.
24
  
 
During the fourteenth century, England enacted the Statute of Labourers that “confined 
the laboring population to stated places of abode, and required them to work at specified rates of 
wages.”25 The Statute confined workers to specific locations and punished people who decided to 
wander in search of jobs. It made being a “vagabond” or vagrant punishable because “it was seen 
as desertion.”26 The punishment stemming from this statute ensured that the movement of the 
poor would be limited and controlled.
27
 
 
Colonial America adopted much of the Statute of Labourers.
28
 The American version of 
this law became known as the vagrancy law. These vagrancy laws, much like the Statute of 
Labourers, limited the movement of poor people from town to town. Most of the time, these 
vagrancy laws were known as “warning-out laws” by local authorities. These laws empowered 
local colonial authorities to notify new people in town that they would have to leave.
29
 New town 
arrivals would be presented with a note that would read in part, “In the name of the Government 
and the people…you are hereby required…to depart out of this town immediately and no longer 
make it the place of [your] residence.”30 
 
 Many towns in colonial America used these notices to protect themselves from economic 
instability.
31
 In order to protect the town, local authorities relied on the argument that a duty 
arose to protect the residents of town.
32
 Therefore, many local authorities pushed new people out 
because these newcomers could potentially cause an economic burden on the town, burden 
residents, and make it difficult for local authorities to carry out their duty.
33
 
 
 Warning-out laws served two purposes for colonial towns. First, these laws served to 
determine who could obtain jobs in colonial towns.
34
 Local authorities ensured that only town 
residents could obtain jobs by requiring that newcomers leave the town after being warned-out.
35
 
The second purpose gave local authorities the legal mechanism to control access to public spaces 
within a town. The requirement that people had to establish residency before obtaining a job or  
show familial ties to the community to live within the towns’ borders ensured that local 
authorities could control who resided within them. This control would prevent vagrants and other 
                                                 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. at n. 31. 
25
 Id.at n. 30. 
26
 Vagabond was defined as a person who wandered around without home or job. See Simon, supra note 3. 
27
 Id. at 639. 
28
Id. at 636 (stating that war efforts left many soldiers displaced and the dissolution of monasteries had a significant 
impact on the homeless population of England). 
29
 Wachholz, supra note 1.  
30
 JOSIAH H. BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND, 1656-1817,17 (Ulan Press 2012), available at 
http://archive.org/details/warningoutinnew00goog. 
31
 JOAN M. CROUSE, THE HOMELESS TRANSIENT IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION: NEW YORK STATE, 1929-1941, 15 
(SUNY Press 1986) (by 1770, every colony except Georgia adopting laws of settlement and removal). 
32
 BENTON, supra note 30, at 20. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Wachholz, supra note 1 (individuals warned-out if viewed as a threat to the supply of waged labor positions). 
35
 Id. at 143. 
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people from being able to use services available to residents of the town because towns felt 
vagrants did not belong.
36
  
 
Colonial vagrancy laws continued after the revolution. Many American towns continued 
to enact these laws. As towns continued to expand, many states passed Settlement Acts that 
expanded on colonial vagrancy laws.
37
 These acts were used “for the punishment of idle and 
disorderly persons, [and] for the support and maintenance of the poor.”38 Many towns and cities 
continued to reinforce colonial rights to warn inhabitants out because it was “necessary for a 
state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and 
possibly convicts.”39 These acts expanded on local authorities’ powers to evict people and 
control the use of public space. Below is a chart showing years that some New England states 
enacted warning-out laws or Settlement Acts. 
 
Table A.1 Warning-Out and Settlement Laws
40
 
 
Name of State Year Law Enacted 
Vermont (Warning-Out) 1787 
Massachusetts (Warning-Out) 1793 
Connecticut (Settlement) 1796 
New Hampshire (Settlement) 1796 
Vermont (Settlement) 1817 
Maine (Settlement) 1821 
 
 
B. Anti-Okie Laws
41
 
 
In the 1930s and 40s, the United States experienced 
two drastic events that affected most of the country. First, 
1930 saw the end of a nationwide economic surplus and the 
beginning of the Great Depression. At its peak, the Great 
Depression negatively impacted over a million people.
42
 
Many U.S. citizens were left without jobs or homes resulting 
in a rise in the urban homeless population. Second, the plains 
states—home to many of the United States’ farmers—
                                                 
36
 Id. 
37
 BENTON, supra note 30, at 90. 
38
 Id. at 100. 
39
 See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
40
 BENTON, supra note 30. 
41
 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH [Cover Art] (1939). 
42
 Casey Garth Jarvis, Homeless: Critical Solutions to a Dire Problem; Escaping Punitive Approaches By Using a 
Human Rights Foundation in the Construction and Enactment of Comprehensive Legislation, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 
407, 416 n. 104 (2011) (citing to the discussion on the number of homeless individuals during the 1930s. The author 
cited various research findings estimating a range of 1 to 5 million homeless individuals in the United States during 
this time). 
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experienced a catastrophic drought.
43
 Many farmers became displaced and went without work 
during this “Dust Bowl.”44 As a result of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, many former 
farmers travelled west in search of new jobs and homes.
45
 
 
Many cities in western states experienced an influx of these former farmers that were 
now being called Okies.
46
 From 1935 to 1940, California received more than 250,000 migrants.
47
 
During this time period, more than 70,000 southwesterners migrated to the San Joaquin Valley in 
search of farming land.
48
 The influx of migrants depressed wages and displaced Hispanic and 
Filipino workers.
49
 Unlike these displaced workers who would leave after the harvest was done, 
Okies would permanently stay. The Okie presence after the harvest—many living in filth, in 
tents and shantytowns along the irrigation ditches—bred a negative sentiment.50  
 
In response to the influx of Okies, many western states passed laws punishing the 
presence of Okies as well as those that tried to assist them. In California, one ordinance from 
Yuba County provided that “[e]very person, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof that 
brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, 
knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”51 While counties passed 
ordinances punishing residents who aided migrants, many other counties punished Okies trying 
to establish permanent residency in the Western state.  
 
In 1941, the issue of controlling the travel of indigents and Okies came before the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The 1930s had seen a net migration of about one million 
people in California.
52
 Employment opportunities in California, however, did not increase to 
meet the new demand.
53
 Increase in migration burdened the social service programs that had 
incentivized people to migrate to California.
54
 In particular, the Farm Security Association 
suffered from an increase as Okies burdened the system.
55
 Counties complained of increases in 
education and sanitation costs, and the state experienced an increase in taxes to support all of 
these programs.  
 
                                                 
43
 Drought: A Paleo Perspective—20th Century Drought, NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER (April 5, 2009) 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/drought/drght_history.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
44
 Stephen Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the DO, RE, MI”: The Commerce Clause and State Residence Restrictions on 
Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (1993) (“When the drought hit, farmers could no longer produce enough 
crops to pay off loans or even pay for essential needs . . . Many farmers were forced off of their land, with one in ten 
farms changing possession at the peak of the farm transfers.”). 
45
 See Stephen Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the DO, RE, MI”: The Commerce Clause and State Residence 
Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (1993); DONALD WORSTER, supra note 4. 
46
 WORSTER, supra note 4 (other terms for Okies including “Arkies” or “Texies”); Ben Reddick, Onetime O.C. 
Supervisor, Dies, LA TIMES, Oct. 28, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/28/news/mn-47602. 
47
 WILLIAM H. MULLINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLA, HIST. AND CULTURE, OKIE MIGRATIONS (2009), 
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=OK008.   
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Reddick, supra note 46. 
51
 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941). 
52
 Reddick, supra note 46. 
53
 Mullins, supra note 47. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
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In 1941, a man, Edwards, had been charged with violating a California statute that 
prohibited residents from knowingly transporting indigents into the state when he helped 
transport a homeless and jobless family member into Yuba County.
56
 In its brief to the Court, the 
State pointed to the economic burden placed on the county and the state as a whole with the 
influx of Okies.
57
 The State further wrote that California had an inherent state power to limit 
entry into the State because they owed a duty to protect their state residents from economic 
disparity.
58
 
 
The Supreme Court found the state’s actions to be unconstitutional.59 The Court found 
that California’s efforts to banish poverty within its borders violated the Commerce Clause and 
the basic rights of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”60 Regarding the Commerce 
Clause, Justice Brynes wrote that a state could not close its doors to prevent the impact of the 
Great Depression.
61
 By closing its doors, a state would force other states to carry a larger burden 
by forcing them to expend more resources on social services.
62
 The action of one state would 
affect other states’ commerce decisions and therefore the act of closing doors to indigents would 
violate federal law under the Commerce Clause.
63
 This act would burden other states that would 
be forced to provide for more individuals, creating a burden on interstate commerce.
64
 Therefore, 
in his written opinion, Brynes made poverty a national issue that concerned every state in the 
union.
65
 By finding that poverty was a national issue, the Supreme Court ultimately found anti-
Okie Laws and their predecessors, Vagrancy Laws, unconstitutional.
66
  
 
C. Jim Crow Laws 
 
 After losing the Civil War, the Southern states were left in economic turmoil and 
instability.
67
 In response to the turmoil and instability, many local governments passed what 
would be known as “Jim Crow” laws that aimed to segregate newly freed African-Americans 
from public spaces.
68
 These laws spanned many generations and led local and state authorities to 
criminalize African-Americans based on their race alone. This section will focus on the early 
judicial rulings validating Jim Crow laws and then look at cases that dismantled Jim Crow laws 
to show how the Supreme Court rejected segregation as a rational justification of exclusion. 
 
Jim Crow’s racial segregation began as early as 1876 and lasted until the mid-twentieth 
century.
69
 Jim Crow laws targeted day-to-day activities of African-Americans. The chart below 
                                                 
56
 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 164 (1941). 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 173. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 172. 
62
 Id. 
63
 See id. at 173. 
64
 Id. at 173. 
65
 Id. 
66
 See id. 
67
 WOODARD, supra note 15. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, UTAH L. REV. 267, 268 
(2001). 
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shows examples of laws that prohibited African-Americans from sharing the same public space 
as non-African-Americans. The span of these laws shows how states criminalized different 
activities and how each used race as a criminalizing factor.  
 
Table C.1 Example of Jim Crow Laws
70
 
 
Name of State Location or Service Denied  Language of the Law 
Alabama Restaurant It shall be unlawful to conduct a 
restaurant or other place for the serving 
of food in the city, at which white and 
colored people are served in the same 
room, unless such white and colored 
persons are effectually separated by a 
solid partition extending from the floor 
upward to a distance of seven feet or 
higher, and unless a separate entrance 
from the street is provided for each 
compartment. 
Georgia Parks It shall be unlawful for colored people 
to frequent any park owned or 
maintained by the city for the benefit, 
use and enjoyment of white persons . . . 
and unlawful for any white person to 
frequent any park owned or maintained 
by the city for the use and benefit of 
colored persons. 
Louisiana Housing Any person . . . who shall rent any part 
of any such building to a negro person 
or a negro family when such building is 
already in whole or in part in occupancy 
by a white person or white family, or 
vice versa when the building is in 
occupancy by a negro person or negro 
family, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
and on conviction thereof shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than 
twenty-five ($25.00) nor more than one 
hundred ($100.00) dollars or be 
imprisoned not less than 10, or more 
than 60 days, or both such fine and 
imprisonment in the discretion of the 
court. 
                                                 
70
 Ferris State Univ., The Origins of Jim Crow, JIM CROW MUSEUM OF RACIST MEMORABILIA (last updated Apr. 
2015), http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/links/misclink/examples/homepage.htm (this project provides examples of Jim 
Crow laws affecting different social services) (last visited May 2, 2015). 
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New Mexico Transportation The . . . Utilities Commission . . . is 
empowered and directed to require the 
establishment of separate waiting rooms 
at all stations for the white and colored 
races. 
Texas Education [The County Board of Education]: shall 
provide schools of two kinds; those for 
white children and those for colored 
children. 
 
In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson adopted a policy that prohibited the 
two races from mixing in public spaces—like those listed above—to ensure minimal interaction 
between the two races.
71
 In Plessy, the partitioning of the two races in a train was at issue.
72
 The 
Court reasoned that keeping the races apart would be beneficial because it would prevent tension 
that may arise from people having to sit with people of another race.
73
 The ruling in Plessy 
signaled the beginning of the justification for the separation of the two races. 
 
This separationist ideology continued well into the twentieth century as local 
governments issued laws that banned African Americans from going to the same restrooms, 
schools, or other public facilities as their white counterparts.
74
 In fact, Jim Crow made racial 
segregation “mandatory, not permissible or negotiable and was an undeniable expression of state 
power.”75  
 
In 1938, however, the Supreme Court provided some expansion in the realm of education 
for African-Americans. An African-American student sought to attend an all-white law school in 
Missouri.
76
 Missouri separated the two races into separate schools; however, there was no law 
school that African-American students could attend.
77
 The Court found that Missouri had 
deprived a class of individuals the same privileges that it had granted its white students.
78
 Due to 
this discrepancy, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for the State to deny law school 
facilities to African-Americans even if there was little or no demand.
79
 Furthermore, it was found 
to be unconstitutional for the State to require African-American residents to attend law school 
out-of-state.
80
 The Court ordered that if there were to be only a single law school, students of all 
races would be eligible for admission.
81
 
 
Ten years later, two more cases continued to expand accessibility to African-Americans. 
In 1946, the Supreme Court ruled that a Virginia law that segregated train passengers was 
                                                 
71
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
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unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.
82
 The Court found 
that the Virginia statute in question, which gave train conductors the power to rearrange 
passengers to avoid integration, created delays in travel and an inefficient system.
83
 Furthermore, 
the Court found that the policing powers of the state could not extend to control public space 
when the activity extended beyond the boundaries of the state.
84
 Since the transportation of 
passengers extended beyond the borders of Virginia, this statute affected the autonomy of the 
states surrounding Virginia and made the state law unconstitutional.
85
  
 
In 1948, the Court overturned a law that prevented African-Americans from purchasing 
property in an all-white neighborhood.
86
 The law in question allowed private individuals to 
create covenants on property that virtually prohibited African-Americans from integrating into 
communities.
87
 The Court ultimately reasoned that the “freedom from discrimination by the 
States in the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be 
effectuated by the framers of the fourteenth Amendment.”88  
 
These preceding cases, when combined, reveal the Court’s reluctance to accept laws 
discriminating against race. The era of Jim Crow began to decline as the Court ruled that 
discriminatory efforts to banish African-Americans from observing the same privileges held by 
white Americans and participating in the same public spaces was now unconstitutional.  
 
This anti-discrimination policy came to the forefront in the landmark decision, Brown v. 
Board of Education. In Brown, the Court ruled that “in the field of public education the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal’ ha[d] no place.”89 The Court further held that “segregation [was] a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws.”90 The decision in Brown v. Board of Education dismantled 
the Jim Crow era in education, and in 1964 President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights 
Act. This Act expanded on what Brown v. Board of Education had done and guaranteed that 
African-Americans, as well as other people of different “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin,” could not be discriminated against by the government.91 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
ensured that people could access public space that they had been deprived of by the Jim Crow 
laws.  
D. Ugly Laws 
 
Ugly laws in the United States also controlled public space and criminalized conduct 
much like previous historical exclusion laws. Ugly laws targeted people that were seen as 
unappealing to society—specifically, people with disabilities. Two cities that enforced Ugly laws 
                                                 
82
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83
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84
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85
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in the twentieth century were Chicago and Portland. Chicago had one of the first known Ugly 
laws. Chicago’s Municipal Code, Section #36034, included an ordinance that stipulated:  
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be 
an unsightly, disgusting or improper is to be allowed in or on the public ways or 
other public places in this city, or shall therein or thereon expose himself to public 
view, under penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each 
offense.
92
  
 
In Portland, Oregon, one law provided that “if any crippled, maimed or deformed 
person [begged] upon the streets or in any public place, they shall upon conviction 
thereof before the Police Court, be fined not less than five dollars nor more than one 
hundred dollars.”93 Portland’s law was unique in that it specifically prohibited 
panhandling by people with physical disabilities.
94
 The Portland city council found this 
law was necessary to ensure that the city could fight against “paupers and vagabonds.”95  
 
Ugly laws spread to many cities across the country and were enacted with the goal of 
preserving the quality of life for cities.
96
 Many of these laws took on the name of “Unsightly 
Beggar Ordinances.”97 In some cities, the local government would pay for citizens who fell 
within Ugly law standards to move to another city to ensure that their physical disabilities did not 
lower the quality of living within the city limits.
98
 
 
Ugly laws were met with many efforts to overturn them. As advocates for people with 
disabilities increased, states either repealed their laws by legislative action, or discontinued their 
enforcement.
99
 Although many states were encouraged to overturn, repeal, or discontinue 
enforcement of the law without intervention from the Supreme Court or Congress, the process 
was slow to conclude.
100
 In 1990, Congress acted to officially end all such discrimination with 
the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).
101
 The Act declared that individuals with disabilities 
were a discrete minority who had been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and “relegated to a position of political powerlessness in 
our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting 
from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to 
participate in, and contribute to, society.”102 The ADA, much like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
worked to allow people access to public spaces that they had once been denied.  
                                                 
92
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E. Sundown Towns 
 
 Sundown Towns first surfaced in the early twentieth century.
103
 Just like other historical 
exclusion efforts, Sundown Towns aimed to prevent certain individuals from occupying public 
space within a town’s geographical borders. In the case of Sundown Towns, these laws were 
meant to keep minorities—often times African American, Chinese American, or Hispanics—
from residing in the town.
104
 This control of public space ensured that many minorities were 
either removed from the city’s limits or discouraged from residing within the limits.105 
 
 Some of the earliest examples of Sundown Towns had postings on city limit signs 
warning minorities from entering or residing in the town. For example, in Rogers, Arkansas, the 
city had a sign that said “N—, You Better Not Let the Sun Set on You in Rogers.”106 Local 
authorities used these signs to enforce ordinances that prohibited minorities from owning 
property.
107
  
 
 While many of the earliest Sundown Town signs targeted African-Americans, as the 
phenomenon expanded to other states, towns began to target other racial minorities. For example, 
in Colorado, there were signs that said “No Mexicans After Night.”108 In Connecticut, “Whites 
Only Within City Limits After Dark.”109 Finally, in Nevada there were signs that prohibited 
“Japs” from being within the city.110 
 
 The effect of Sundown Towns created more of a social exclusion rather than a legal 
exclusion. While some Sundown Towns passed ordinances that prohibited minorities from being 
within the city limits or established property covenants limiting land ownership to white 
Americans, many relied on the effect of the signs alone to keep people out.
111
 The effect of these 
signs left a dark legacy for many towns. In Anna, Illinois, even as late as 2001, the name Anna 
was colloquially understood to stand for “Ain’t No N— Around.”112 
 
 Unlike other historical exclusion efforts, Sundown Towns were not directly overturned or 
repealed. The disappearance of Sundown Towns flowed incidentally from Supreme Court cases 
ruling that restrictive covenants were unconstitutional.
113
 As stated earlier, the Supreme Court 
held that courts could not enforce racial covenants on real estate.
114
 The Court held that courts 
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could not enforce these covenants because this would create a state action discriminating against 
a group in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
115
 Finally, the Supreme Court held that under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 Congress could regulate the sale of private property in order to 
prevent racial discrimination.
116
 The Court found that Congress’s duty under the Thirteenth 
Amendment allowed Congress to bar all public or private racial discrimination in the sale of 
property to remedy the final “badges and incidents of slavery.”117  
 
 While the Court’s ruling in these two cases invalidated many private covenants and 
allowed many minorities an opportunity to live in many all-white cities, most Sundown Towns 
continued to make minorities feel unwanted. Whether it was a lynching or sign at the city limits, 
most Sundown Towns did not use ordinances to control public space.
118
 This effect can be seen 
as new “Brown Sundown Towns” appear in some Southwestern cities.119 These Brown Sundown 
Towns, much like old Sundown Towns, work to limit access to public space. With Brown 
Sundown Towns, cities now work to exclude undocumented immigrants.
120
  
 
The study of historical criminalization laws reveals a framework of public space and 
control. Vagrancy Laws and Sundown Towns worked to banish outsiders from establishing 
residency within a city. Jim Crow Laws, Anti-Okie Laws, and Ugly Laws worked to remove and 
punish undesirable people and prohibit their access to public spaces. Over the past 200 years, the 
United States has justified these exclusion laws to protect against lawlessness entering into 
public space. Vagrancy and Anti-Okie Laws prevailed for years because state and local 
governments relied on historical duties that governments owed to their residents. When looking 
at how governments justified these exclusion laws, similarities appear within modern anti-
homeless ordinances.
121
 Modern ordinances, when looked at through the framework created with 
these historical exclusion laws, begin to look very similar in form and function.  
II. MODERN CASE STUDIES 
The three case studies below illustrate different ways U.S. cities are implementing new 
and inventive methods for removing homeless individuals from public space or criminalizing 
their existence within that area. These are only a few examples of ordinances of this kind, and 
any state in the nation could provide similar examples to illustrate similar trends. 
 
A. Honolulu, HI 
 
 Attempting to ensure the island’s continued popularity as a tourist paradise, city officials 
in Honolulu are aggressively targeting the area homeless population.  The City Council in 
Honolulu, Hawaii has recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting homeless individuals from 
sitting or lying down on public sidewalks. This would not be a particularly egregious example of 
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an anti-homeless ordinance compared to other ordinances aimed at the homeless, except for the 
fact that supporters of this new ordinance are transparent about their goal of completely 
removing the homeless population from the area.
122
 Citing the area’s popularity as a tourist 
destination, its reputation for good “photo-ops,” and the need to keep tourists coming back, local 
leaders believe that the best method for dealing with the homeless “epidemic” in the area is to 
first criminalize life-sustaining conduct in public spaces and later move all of the homeless 
people off of the island entirely.
123
 Therefore, one plan to deal with homeless individuals in 
Honolulu is to relocate these people to a small industrial island to camp. This island is far out of 
the view of tourists, was formerly used as an internment camp during WWII, and contains a large 
wastewater facility and former garbage dump.
124
     
 
As a further indication of how some leaders feel about the issue of homelessness in this 
city, Hawaii State representative Tom Bower reportedly walked through the streets of Honolulu 
recently with a sledgehammer, and proceeded to smash any shopping cart he could find that he 
suspected might be used by a homeless person.
125
 In addition, Bower has been quoted as saying 
he is “disgusted” by homeless people,126 and admits to walking around Waikiki and waking up 
sleeping homeless people and telling them “Get your ass moving!”127 
 
B. Clearwater, FL 
 
City officials in Clearwater, Florida have a similar plan to push the homeless population 
out of their city. Once again, the new ordinances they have adopted are similar to many 
ordinances around the country, as these new laws commonly prohibit sitting and lying down in 
public areas.
128
 Like in Waikiki, city officials in Clearwater are also transparent about their intent 
to drive the local homeless population elsewhere.
129
 In addition to passing new ordinances and 
verbally supporting the removal of the homeless, city officials are also shutting off the water at 
public spigots, welding the doors shut at public bathrooms, and discouraging the distribution of 
free food, even though the city does not have sufficient shelter beds to accommodate the 
homeless in the area.
130
 The city has not only refrained from opening or expanding any shelter 
facilities; it is actually reducing financial support to existing shelters, resulting in closures.
131
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Clearwater officials’ plan to remove homeless people from their city has been likened to 
“squeezing a balloon.”132 One city official characterized the city’s efforts as the elimination of 
services that have become “public enablers” for homeless people.133 As part of the city’s plan to 
push homeless people out of Clearwater, violators of certain anti-homeless ordinances are given 
the choice between jail time and being admitted into an emergency shelter in another city.
134
A 
consultant hired by the city for $25,000 says that these measures are necessary to end the city’s 
“history of enablement.”135 
 
A number of documents acquired through public records requests were recently produced 
by the City of Clearwater.
136
 Among these was a City document titled, “Some of the tools 
officers can utilize to limit the socially undesirable behaviors that an individual, including a 
homeless person, may sometimes exhibit in public are as follows:” followed by a list of 28 city 
ordinances and federal statutes that the City finds useful to criminalize area homeless 
individuals. Another City document revealed that, although a housed individual in violation of 
one of these ordinances would be issued a notice to appear, a homeless individual is given the 
choice between jail time and immediate forced admission to the area shelter.
137
  Homeless people 
in the area reportedly call the Pinellas Safe Harbor shelter facility the “jailter” because it is run 
by prison guards and is on the prison grounds
138
 and likely due to the fact that many homeless 
individuals are brought there in the back of a police car. 
 
C. Burien, WA
139
 
 
 The targeted criminalization of area 
homeless individuals in Burien recently 
gained national attention.  A recent ordinance 
passed in Burien, Washington is a particularly 
egregious and shocking example of a city’s 
attempt to remove homeless people from 
public spaces. The city passed a trespass 
ordinance that would be enforced if a person 
were determined to have a “hygiene or scent 
that is unreasonably offensive.”140 Once a 
person is cited for trespass under this 
ordinance, even if it is just for smelling a 
certain way, that person is now subject to 
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criminal punishment for returning to the area of the original issuance.
141
 The ACLU of 
Washington immediately spoke out about the unconstitutional vagueness and arbitrariness of the 
ordinance.
142
 After the ACLU sent a cease and desist order to the City of Burien, city officials 
agreed to reconsider the ordinance’s odor provision in light of the negative press and public 
outrage the ordinance generated.
143
 
 
 Some Burien officials claim that the odor ordinance was not proposed to target the 
homeless, but rather to address residents’ concerns about feeling “intimidated” in public 
places.
144
 To justify this new proposed ordinance, which also targets “boisterous” behavior, a 
city official cited the need for people to feel safe in places where they bring their children.
145
 One 
Burien councilmember, who reportedly was the only one to vote against the proposed ordinance, 
believes that the ordinance appeared to be an attempt to target a group of local homeless youth 
who are largely “kids of color,” raising concerns that the ordinance is largely a response to local 
residents’ personal fears.146 Unlike most other homeless criminalization ordinances, Burien’s 
odor ordinance has failed to appear neutral in the eyes of the public, resulting in the kind of 
public response that proponents of homeless criminalization efforts naturally attempt to avoid. 
 
 Even with the apparent removal of Burien’s odor provision in ordinance 606, the 
remaining language now codified in Burien’s ordinance 621 is still described by homeless rights 
advocates as “a recipe for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement” due to its targeting of 
homeless individuals.
147
 Recent extensive research reveals further concerns with the City of 
Burien’s targeted criminalization methods.148 For example, Burien’s municipal code contains a 
provision that gives the City the discretion to decide to choose either a civil infraction or a 
criminal misdemeanor charge against any violation of a civil ordinance, allowing for problematic 
discriminatory enforcement.
149
 
 
 These three case studies are just a few, brief examples of how cities are using the new 
criminalization ordinances to achieve the same goals that were sought under the old historical 
exclusion laws. Although some cities are explicit about their motivations, while others cite 
different justifications, the overall goal of these modern homeless criminalization ordinances are 
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the same. The goal is the removal of homeless people from sight. Although the specific language 
of the old laws and the new laws may appear different on their face, historical exclusion laws and 
the new homeless criminalization ordinances are actually very similar as applied. 
 
III. SHIFT FROM HISTORICAL EXCLUSION LAWS TO MODERN ORDINANCES 
Historical exclusion laws were eventually struck down by the courts as 
unconstitutional.
150
 Some challenges to the constitutionality of the archaic laws were successful 
by showing that the law (1); violated the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
clause by punishing a person’s status (e.g., poor, drug addict, destitute, jobless) rather than their 
conduct,
151
 (2); was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth amendment Due Process 
Clause by providing insufficient notice of the conduct to be prohibited,
152
 and/or (3); failed to 
provide adequate standards leading to unfettered and discriminatory enforcement discretion by 
police.
153
  
 
The loss of historical exclusion laws led cities to seek new methods to achieve the 
removal of unwanted groups of people. Often influenced by an emerging theory called “Broken 
Windows,” cities passed laws that were meant to avoid constitutionality challenges, while still 
providing the same enforcement power to exclude.
154
  
 
A. How Historical Exclusion Laws Led to Modern Criminalization Ordinances 
The fall of historical exclusion laws led to the creation of the modern criminalization 
ordinances that are enforced against homeless people today.
155
 The following is an example of 
the type of vagrancy law that was prevalent in the U.S. before the civil rights movement: 
 
All persons . . . who have no visible means of living, who in ten days do not seek 
employment, nor labor when employment is offered to them, all healthy beggars, 
who travel with written statements of their misfortunes, all persons who roam 
about from place to place without any lawful business, all lewd and dissolute 
persons who live in and about houses of Ill-Fame; all . . . common drunkards may 
be committed to jail and sentenced to hard labor for such time as the Court, before 
whom they are convicted shall think proper, not exceeding ninety days.
156
  
These laws often classified “vagrants” as “drunkards,” “pilferers,” “runaways,” “idle or 
disorderly persons,” “lewd or wanton persons,” and/or those who “neglect their employment.”157  
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Vagrancy laws provided police officers an effective tool for the removal of unwanted 
people from public space because of the broad discretion the officers were granted by the 
wording of the statute. First, the officer had the discretion to decide whether a person’s actions 
were in violation of the law, but the description of the prohibited conduct was ambiguous and 
required a subjective determination by the officer. For example, the officer had the discretion to 
decide who was “drunk,” who was “not seeking employment,” or who was “roaming or 
wandering.”158 Second, the officer also had the discretion to classify a person based on his or her 
visible status. A person could be considered in violation of the law entirely based on who they 
were or how they looked. For example, the officer could decide who appeared “lewd or 
dissolute,” “unemployed,” like a “common drunkard,” or other similar classifications that might 
fall under the wording of the law.
159
 These vagrancy laws were eventually struck down as 
unconstitutional due to their vagueness and the determination that they afforded police too much 
discretion in deciding who to cite.
160
  
 
In addition to the unconstitutional degree of discretion afforded to police under such 
laws, these laws were also commonly found unconstitutional because they did not provide 
sufficient notice as to what conduct would constitute a violation of the statute.
161
 A Jacksonville, 
Florida statute was struck down for criminalizing “nightwalking,” “loafing,” and “wandering and 
strolling” because the court determined that a person of normal intelligence would not know 
whether he or she was in violation of the statute while simply walking down the street.
162
 The 
overbreadth of the old vagrancy laws therefore ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process clause requirement for proper notice of prohibited conduct.
163
 
 
Following the repeal of these historical exclusion laws after the civil rights movement, 
cities began enacting civil ordinances that avoided the issue of unconstitutionality by more 
specifically describing the “conduct” or “behavior” to be prohibited.164 Examples of the more 
contemporary conduct-specific laws include sit-and-lie ordinances, sidewalk obstruction 
ordinances, anti-camping ordinances, prohibitions on storing private property in public places, 
public urination and defecation ordinances, park exclusion orders, panhandling ordinances, 
prohibitions on sleeping in vehicles, public nuisance laws, and loitering with “intent” ordinances.  
 
While vagrancy statutes were previously determined unconstitutional for criminalizing 
people who appeared “lewd,” “wanton,” or “unemployed,” contemporary ordinances have 
largely avoided constitutional challenges by not characterizing the types of people who will be 
found in violation of the law. Where vagrancy laws criminalized “wandering” or “idleness,” new 
ordinances criminalize “sitting,” “camping,” and “panhandling.”165 This attempt to increase the 
language specificity for the conduct to be prohibited is an effort to avoid the issue of facial 
unconstitutionality, and an attempt to resolve the issue associated with the requirement for 
adequate notice. Although this new more conduct-specific language (e.g., sitting, lying down, 
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panhandling) attempts to remove the ambiguity that was present in vagrancy laws, many believe 
that the new ordinances still contain ambiguity. This statutory evolution is a clear response to the 
loss of historical exclusion laws and the facial unconstitutionality challenges they faced. 
 
While the increased language specificity of modern criminalization ordinances attempts 
to evade Due Process challenges, the more specific new ordinance language also restricts the 
effectiveness of these laws as a broad tool for law enforcement officers. Vagrancy laws provided 
officers one umbrella statute to utilize in many different situations due to the broad and 
ambiguous language of the statute. The new ordinances’ specific language requires a person to 
perform the listed conduct in order to be found in violation of the law, in theory allowing less 
room for unfettered and discriminatory enforcement discretion. Responding to the loss of the all-
encompassing vagrancy law method, cities have resorted to adopting a variety of ordinances that 
criminalize a wide range of behaviors. Instead of having one broad vagrancy law to use as an 
enforcement tool to remove individuals from public space, cities have adopted many different 
ordinances to achieve similar results. This new multiple ordinance approach has helped law 
enforcement regain the broad discretion that they were previously allowed under historical 
exclusion laws.
166
  
 
The increase in the statutory language specificity of prohibited conduct does not mean 
that the categories of prohibited conduct are narrowly tailored. Categories of prohibited conduct 
such as sitting, lying down, relieving oneself, and storing of personal property in public are 
arguably less ambiguous than prior statutory language. Even if modern criminalization 
ordinances do contain less ambiguity, they still remain extremely broad in terms of what they 
restrict. For someone who has no home and no place to stay, it is very difficult not to violate 
these ordinances because these laws restrict the conduct of life-sustaining activities. The result of 
this use of combined modern criminalization ordinances is broad enforcement discretion 
comparable to what was exercised under the historical exclusion law regime. 
 
To further understand the shift from historical exclusion laws to modern criminalization 
ordinances, it is helpful to consider the theory behind the modern criminalization regime and the 
policy goals it advocates. In the post-civil rights era, new tools in the form of criminalization 
ordinances allowed cities to begin implementing an enforcement regime influenced by a theory 
called “Broken Windows.”   
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B. Broken Windows Theory
167
           
Today’s laws have their roots in the broken-windows theory which holds that one 
poor person in a neighborhood is like a first unrepaired broken window and if 
such a “window” is not immediately fixed or removed, it is a signal that no one 
cares, disorder will flourish and the community will go to hell in a hand basket. A 
direct outcome of this theory is the introduction of legislation to criminalize the 
presence of homeless people in public.
168
 
 The Broken Windows Theory has 
shaped the policing strategies in many cities 
since the early 1990’s, and the overall strategy 
is one of zero-tolerance.
169
 The theory asserts 
that the catalyst for the overall decline of an 
area is one “broken window” or a similar sign 
that the area has cosmetic defects, such as 
graffiti. If the window is not immediately fixed, 
the theory suggests that others will likely break 
more windows, spray more graffiti, and leave trash in the streets because they will see the area as 
a place where such behavior is tolerated. Next, Broken Windows Theory proponents believe that 
the concerned residents become fearful and move out or withdraw from these public spaces, 
resulting in the loss of social control.
170
 Next, this theory suggests that organized crime and 
serious criminal actors seek out neighborhoods that appear to be in disorder or disrepair.
171
 The 
cycle of crime and poverty is believed to have been set in motion, and more serious crime will 
inevitably envelop the area.
172
 This is why the Broken Windows Theory recommends that the 
very first broken window should be “fixed” immediately in order to avoid the inevitable 
landslide of criminality that will otherwise follow.
173
  
 
 In practice, the Broken Windows approach often begins with a law enforcement crack-
down on small misdemeanor offenses and less serious crimes in order to cut-off the potential for 
an area to fall into disrepair in the first place.
174
 This focus on petty crimes suggests that high 
crime areas are a result of an initial period of unchecked low level crimes or an appearance of 
disrepair or dirtiness. The application of the Broken Windows Theory to the issue of 
homelessness often results in the assertion that the presence of homeless people in a 
neighborhood leads to high levels of serious crime. This theory, therefore, acts as a justification 
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for the forcible removal of the homeless population from a geographic area as the first step in 
restoring social order and regaining desirable aesthetic qualities. 
 
 The Broken Windows approach has come under increasing scrutiny. With the recent 
killings of several African Americans at the hands of police officers who were attempting to 
prevent relatively petty crimes, the policing strategy of cracking down on minor offences has 
many people contemplating the costs associated with such an approach.
175
 Others assert that this 
Broken Windows approach is simply a tool used by law enforcement to discriminate against 
marginalized groups such as racial minorities and the homeless.
176
 If the persistence of 
homelessness in America is any indication, it appears that this theory has not helped to alleviate 
the homeless problem. 
 
C. Criminalizing Homelessness in Washington State 
 
 The following is an example of a former Washington State vagrancy law: 
Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Washington, That 
the following persons are vagrants: All persons who tell fortunes, or where lost 
and stolen goods may be found; all common prostitutes, and keepers of bawdy 
houses or houses for the resort of prostitutes; al habitual drunkards, gamesters, or 
other disorderly persons; all persons wandering about and having no visible 
calling, or business to maintain themselves; all persons going about as collectors 
of alms for charitable institutions under any false, or fraudulent pre- tenses; all 
persons playing or betting in any street or public or open place, at, or with any 
table or instrument of gaming at any game or pretended game of chance.
177
  
A number of varieties of criminalizing ordinances have emerged in Washington State cities to 
replace old vagrancy laws such as the one quoted above. Considering that the Broken Windows 
Theory has at its core an aesthetic “clean-up the neighborhood” element, cities such as Seattle 
have used this theory to justify the control of public space. The new criminalization ordinances 
largely focus on prohibiting specified conduct, and the consequences usually involve the 
violator’s exclusion from a specified geographic area. Rather than an attempt to remedy the issue 
(presumably the prohibited conduct), cities appear to be predominantly concerned with moving 
violators of the ordinances out of certain areas, and inevitably moving them into another area.
178
 
 
 For example, Seattle has many options to draw from in order to remove “undesirable” 
people from public spaces including new types of criminalization ordinances such as a sit and lie 
ordinance,
179
 a sleeping in public spaces ordinance,
180
 parks exclusion orders,
181
 an aggressive 
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panhandling ordinance,
182
 a sidewalk obstruction ordinance,
183
 an anti-camping ordinance,
184
 a 
public urination/defecation ordinance,
185
 and a storage of personal property on public property 
ordinance.
186
 While Washington’s historical vagrancy laws were eventually struck down because 
they granted police officers too much discretion to decide who to cite, the new laundry list of 
ordinance options provided to officers allows them to choose which ordinance to use to either fit 
a particular situation or to achieve a desired result. Although the new ordinances may appear 
more specific regarding the conduct they prohibit, now a variety of tools exist for a city to 
choose from, resulting in a similar degree of discretion as was allowed under historical exclusion 
laws.  
 
 A recent comprehensive report on Washington’s homeless criminalization ordinances 
reveals a number of problematic issues with the criminalization method.
187
  One of the most 
concerning issues with many modern criminalization ordinances is the civil/criminal legal 
distinction of an ordinance. While classifying an ordinance as civil rather than criminal may 
appear to some as a sign of lenience, the actual effect is a relaxation of due process for those 
cited under the civil ordinance.
188
 Due to the civil classification of the citation, the homeless 
person cited (1) loses the right to legal representation, (2) loses the right to a jury trial, and (3) is 
often cited for a later criminal charge due to the failure to pay a fine.
189
 Some cities have 
reportedly been changing criminal ordinances to civil ordinances because many homeless 
individuals, given their day in court, prevail due to sympathetic juries.
190
 
 
 Another recent report on the intersectionality of homelessness and other marginalized 
groups reveals some often-unseen discriminatory issues that arise under Washington’s homeless 
criminalization practices.
191
 This report shows that racial minorities, women, veterans, LGBTQ 
individuals, individuals with mental disabilities, and incarcerated individuals are all 
disproportionately represented in the homeless population, and are therefore disproportionately 
affected by homeless criminalization ordinances.
192
 
 
 In addition to the discriminatory nature of these ordinances, another recent report on the 
cost of homeless criminalization reveals that this method is both extremely expensive and 
ineffective at reducing recidivism rates.
193
 This comprehensive cost analysis reveals the 
enormous costs cities in Washington incur in their efforts to criminalize homelessness, and also 
provides examples of cities around the country that have reduced those costs by implementing 
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alternative programs to address homelessness.
194
 Considering that Washington’s homeless 
criminalization ordinances are largely aimed at geographic banishment, a comparison to former 
historical laws that shared this goal reveals problematic similarities between the two types of 
laws. 
 
IV. CRIMINALIZATION: WE’VE TRIED AND REJECTED THIS BEFORE 
 
The ordinances that are disproportionately enforced upon homeless people are now 
written differently than previous unconstitutional laws. Where former vagrancy laws were 
lengthy and contained multiple prohibited conducts, the new criminalization ordinances are 
purported to be more brief and specific. Where vagrancy laws contained ambiguous 
characterizations and allowed subjective discretion, new ordinances claim to target specified 
conduct and do not name the groups or types of people who are targeted. Although some of the 
apparent facial similarities between historical and modern criminalization laws may have been 
removed, these two types of laws are similar as applied. 
 
In order to understand the comparison between the historical exclusion laws and the 
modern homeless criminalization ordinances, it is important to explain the scope of the 
comparison. Historical exclusion laws were often broad and all encompassing, and therefore only 
one law was required to accomplish the enforcement goals of a city. The modern ordinances are 
commonly more direct and specific, and therefore cities often enact multiple ordinances to 
accomplish their enforcement goals. Therefore, when comparing the historical exclusion laws to 
the modern criminalization ordinances, the comparison is not between a single historical law and 
any one modern ordinance, but rather between a historical law and the collective group of 
modern ordinances a city possesses. Using this comparison, it is possible to see the similarities 
between these two types of enforcement strategies as applied.  
 
A. Similarities Between Modern and Historical Criminalization Efforts 
The men and women out here, they don’t want to be homeless…I don’t care how 
broken down you are, not one person out on the street wants to be homeless. And 
to be penalized for being homeless? ... You got to go to the back of the bus, you 
can’t come into certain restaurants, you can’t go to the bathroom…it’s already a 
system that needs a lot of work.
195
 
 
Comparing historical exclusion laws with the modern homeless criminalization ordinance 
regime exposes four distinct similarities between the historical repealed laws and the new 
ordinances: both legal tools (1) disproportionately affect one marginalized group of people; (2) 
result in unavoidable violations by the targeted group; (3) remove all practicable options from 
the targeted group; and (4) seek to remove the targeted group from sight. 
 
First, modern criminalization ordinances do not affect all citizens equally. A law that 
criminalizes begging does not affect the wealthy and the homeless equally. Laws that prohibit 
storing private property in public or public urination do not equally affect someone who owns a 
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home. Similar to the historical exclusion laws that were found to be unconstitutional, these 
ordinances do not have an equitable impact.  
 
In practice, modern criminalization ordinances only affect one marginalized group of 
people.  Jim Crow laws were passed specifically to affect African Americans. Ugly laws were 
meant to restrict the conduct or geographic location of those who were deemed “unsightly,” 
“repulsive,” or “ugly,” and disproportionately targeted disabled people. Anti-Okie laws 
specifically targeted migrant workers, and Sundown Town laws targeted racial minorities. 
Therefore, one of the most identifiable characteristics of these various historical exclusion laws 
was that they disproportionately impacted a marginalized group or groups.  
 
Although a law that prohibits sitting or lying down on a sidewalk facially prohibits all 
people from sitting or lying down on the sidewalk, there are a few reasons why the law in 
practice disproportionately targets the homeless. Police have the ability to selectively enforce 
these laws. The typical enforcement of this type of ordinance is not the citation of a man in a 
business suit enjoying his brownbag lunch on the curb outside his favorite café. Armed with this 
type of ordinance, a police officer instead may selectively enforce such a law in order to address 
complaints by local business owners. Moreover, as an alternative to eating his lunch on the curb, 
the man in the business suit has other options of places to sit that are unavailable to the homeless 
individual. Once again, because those who do not appear homeless have the option to sit inside 
various establishments, this type of law only affects the homeless in practice. Similar to the 
unconstitutional historical exclusion laws, modern ordinances only affect one targeted group of 
people. 
 
Second, aside from the problems of the unequal applicability of these ordinances and 
their targeted creation, there is also an issue with a homeless person’s ability to obey the law 
because of their circumstances. Vagrancy laws made criminals of those who were determined to 
be poor or unemployed simply because they were poor or unemployed. Therefore, it was not 
possible for a “vagrant” to comply with the law, resulting in a violation based on their 
circumstances alone. Considering that the new criminalization ordinances prohibit life-sustaining 
activities such as sitting, lying down, sleeping, urinating, eating, and storing belongings, 
homeless people in the area actually cannot comply with the laws.
196
 In effect, a homeless person 
is made a criminal simply because they have no reasonable alternatives but to perform such 
conduct in public. Therefore, similar to the unconstitutional vagrancy laws, these modern 
ordinances effectively criminalize a person’s status.  
 
Third, the wide coverage of life-sustaining activities the modern ordinances prohibit 
result in a lack of options for homeless individuals. In the abstract, the typical historical vagrancy 
law would require a poor person to either immediately lift themselves from poverty or to leave 
the city in order to comply with the statute. Similarly, a Sundown Town law would require a 
racial minority to leave the city in order to avoid non-compliance. Therefore, the lack of options 
created by the law was common among the historical exclusion laws. Considering many cities’ 
lack of available shelter beds
197
 and the fact that cities are divided into private property and 
public land, how can a homeless person comply with an ordinance that prohibits them from 
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“camping” on public property? How can a homeless person avoid violating a public urination 
ordinance if there are no public restrooms provided in the area? The combined effect of the 
various ordinances and the lack of services in the area create a situation in which a homeless 
individual is unable to legally exist in the city and must therefore relocate to another city. To 
further follow the chain of events, if neighboring cities similarly have criminalization ordinances 
and a lack of available services, the homeless individual is without viable options to legally 
survive in his or her new location. Similar to the unconstitutional laws that have been struck-
down, modern criminalization ordinances result in a lack of options for the targeted marginalized 
group. 
 
Finally, modern criminalization ordinances attempt to remove a specific “undesirable” 
group from sight.
198
 Jim Crow, Anti-Okie, Sundown Town, and Ugly laws, based on their 
explicit language, were all drafted to exclude specific marginalized groups from a geographical 
area or from public space. Because these historical laws criminalized one’s presence in a 
specified area, and the only option for compliance was to leave that area, a common 
characteristic of these laws was their goal of removing targeted groups from sight. The 
prevalence of exclusion orders and the evidence shown in the case studies indicates that the 
overall policy goal of the modern homeless criminalization ordinance regime is the removal of 
homeless individuals from the city. This is a very different and less admirable goal than the 
eradication of homelessness. This policy goal of physical removal is another way in which the 
homeless criminalization ordinances are the same as the unconstitutional historical exclusion 
laws that have been struck down.  
B. Trends to Overturn Historical Exclusion Laws 
 
The effects of many of the historical exclusion laws were felt decades after their 
implementation. While the efforts of advocates in response to historical exclusion laws caused 
local authorities to stop enforcing many of the punishments, in most instances, it was not until 
judicial and legislative efforts intervened that many of these laws ceased to operate. 
 
Many of the exclusion laws that were overturned by the Supreme Court were found to 
violate some fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. In Edwards, the Court said that 
denying vagrants the right to travel from state to state violated their right to “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.” In Brown, the Court ruled that denying African-American children the 
opportunity to a proper education denied them the right to be a well-equipped member of our 
society.  
 
The Supreme Court, in striking down these laws, has looked beyond the conduct that the 
law is prohibiting. Not only is the Court looking at the purpose of the law, but they are also 
looking at the consequences of the law. In its rulings, the Court has found that many of these 
laws have detrimental effects on the groups being criminalized.  
 
In the same vein, Congress and state legislatures have also found that the legislation in 
question violated a fundamental right. Specifically, looking at the American with Disabilities 
Act, Congress acknowledges that people with disabilities had become a marginalized group that 
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had lost its political voice and power. State legislatures and local governments refusing to 
enforce ordinances like those found in Sundown towns also showed that a fundamental right of a 
group was being limited.  
 
Finally, one trend in the reasoning to overturn historical exclusion laws was the 
acknowledgement that many of these laws had historical roots. Sometimes the roots were found 
in earlier American legislation or cases, and in the case of Anti-Okie laws, were found to have 
English ties. Each time one of these laws was overturned, however, the Court or legislators found 
that it was time to move away from those roots: they focused on societal change from when these 
discriminatory laws were first accepted. These laws needed to be overturned because later 
generations found they were on the wrong side of history.  
C. The Shift in Public Opinion on Historical Criminalization Efforts 
 
This section will explore the common phenomenon of a shift in public support after a 
discriminatory law is determined to be unconstitutional. Historical exclusion laws commonly 
enjoyed at least moderate, if not widespread, support during their creation and implementation; 
however, when these laws are determined to be unconstitutional, public support often drops 
drastically.
199
 
 
For example, Jim Crow laws institutionalized racial discrimination against African 
American citizens for a century after slavery ended.
200
 After such a long period of time, the 
political will and societal pressure was not able bring about the repeal of these archaic laws until 
the 1960’s and 1970’s.201 Although it took a long time to repeal these laws and there was fierce 
opposition from proponents of racial discrimination, eventually public opinion shifted in the 
post-Jim Crow era concerning the former discriminatory laws.
202
  
 
Some public opinion polls suggest increasing rejection of racially discriminatory laws. 
Although it is difficult to find public opinion statistics relating specifically to the repeal of 
historical discriminatory laws, general polls gauging society’s historical and current trends can 
be helpful to show dramatic shifts in societal beliefs. While a 1958 poll showed that 94% of 
white Americans disapproved of interracial marriages between African Americans and whites, a 
2013 poll indicated that now 13% of whites disapprove of the same marital union.
203
 This poll 
suggests an 81% shift in less than 60 years, showing how public opinion can change once a 
discriminatory regime is determined impermissible. Similar polls show that 33% of white 
Americans are still dissatisfied with the treatment of African Americans today, and 51% of white 
Americans support affirmative action for racial minorities.
204
 Though not specifically related to 
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the historical discriminatory laws, these statistics indicate a shift in public opinion over the 
course of a generation. 
 
Similar polls suggest comparable shifts in public opinion concerning issues such as 
disability rights, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights. While Ugly Laws historically acted as a 
blanket ban on disabled individuals’ presence in society, subsequent legal challenges and current 
legal efforts continue to push for the expansion of disability rights. Currently, constitutional 
challenges are emerging across the country to enable marriage equality. This is likely to be the 
next example of a dramatic shift in public support for a historically marginalized group.
205
 
206
 
Recent polls have shown 55% support nationwide for gay marriage, compared to 32% in 1996.
207
 
  
The comparison of homelessness to these other historically marginalized groups is not 
meant to suggest that each faces the same struggles and issues. Still, these examples do suggest 
that public education and advocacy are key to protecting the basic civil and constitutional rights 
of homeless Americans. Although these shifts in public opinion on discriminatory practices often 
take far longer than they should, eventually these former practices are looked back upon with 
shame and regret. Considering the harsh and targeted consequences of the modern homeless 
criminalization ordinance, society will likely similarly look back on its former treatment of 
vulnerable individuals with regret and disbelief. 
 
D. Predictions Based on Historical Criminalization Rejections 
 
 Previous sections in this brief established that (1) modern homeless criminalization 
ordinances are fundamentally similar to unconstitutional historical exclusion laws, and (2) public 
opinion shifts once a law is exposed as discriminatory. More recently, a handful of modern 
criminalization ordinances have been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds, perhaps 
indicating the beginning of a line of precedent for challenging homeless criminalization 
ordinances.
208
 Considering that the majority of society looks back at historical discriminatory 
laws with disgust and disbelief, and considering how similar anti-homeless ordinances are in 
function and purpose to these historical examples, proponents of anti-homeless laws are on the 
wrong side of history. 
 
 Although the modern criminalization ordinances initially appeared to successfully avoid 
the type of legal challenges that brought about the repeal of historical exclusion laws, there have 
been a number of more recent cases that have exposed the potential unconstitutional features of 
modern ordinances.
209
 These successful constitutional legal arguments included showings of
 
Fourteenth Amendment lack of notice and discriminatory enforcement practices,
210
 violations of 
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substantive due process and freedom of association rights,
211
 and
 
Fourth Amendment violations 
for random stops and searches and destruction of personal property.
212
 These successful 
constitutional challenges expose the legal susceptibility of these ordinances, but political will and 
public knowledge of the issue are still necessary components of a successful social movement to 
repeal discriminatory laws. 
 
 For now, the language of modern criminalization ordinances appears to have curbed 
much of the public outcry that opposed laws such as Ugly Laws, Jim Crow laws, and Sundown 
Town laws. By adopting ordinances that do not explicitly name “homeless people” as the target, 
proponents of the criminalization method are able to keep the discriminatory nature of the laws 
under the radar to a large extent. Still, advocacy efforts by organizations that fight for homeless 
rights continue to bring this issue into the public eye. 
 
 The modern homeless criminalization ordinances are, in practice, the same as the old 
vagrancy laws, Jim Crow laws, Ugly Laws, Sundown Town laws, and Anti-Okie laws. These 
historical laws have all been found unconstitutional, and have therefore been repealed. Although 
there was popular support for these laws before their repeal, they now are looked back on by the 
vast majority of society as objectionable, cruel, and discriminatory. Considering their similarity 
to these historical exclusion laws, modern homeless criminalization ordinances will be similarly 
evaluated—and rejected—in the near future. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Historical exclusion laws and modern anti-homeless ordinances work to punish the 
conduct of people seen as undesirable by society. The conduct in and of itself is not criminal. 
The criminalization of homelessness shares many similarities with the criminalization of many 
other groups throughout history. Historical exclusion laws worked, just like anti-homeless 
ordinances, to prohibit groups of people from having access to public spaces within towns or 
cities. The purpose of excluding them was to limit their ability to engage in the same public 
spheres as the groups that these laws targeted.  
 
Anti-homeless laws are detrimental to the homeless population in the United States. For 
now, modern criminalization ordinances remain the principle means by which cities attempt to 
control the homeless population. Similar to their predecessors, these ordinances are often not 
narrowly tailored to advance public health or safety, but instead they function as tools to 
physically remove homeless people from public space. The purging of homeless people is not an 
attempt to end homelessness. It is an attempt to control and define who has access to public 
space. Anti-homeless ordinances truly share the same criminalizing and marginalizing effect as 
historical exclusion laws. It is not difficult to imagine society looking back at ordinances that 
criminalized homeless people for sitting down, sleeping, and other life sustaining activities, and 
regretting them—like historical exclusion laws.  
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